Elijah the Tishbite wrote:
> The idea that valuation is
> subjective and not in any way based on any universal principles, or on
> anything rationally discernible, is what Mortimer Adler called
> suicidal psychologizing on the part of philosophy - a case of copping
> out on the task of explaining the human being; a copping out that has
> made the bulk of the people believe philosophy to be irrelevant to
> their lives.
>
On several occasions I have posted what I maintain constitutes
a science-like derivation of a moral 'ought' from a scientific
"is" (i.e., the predictions of formal models of natural
selection that naturally selected creatures 'ought' to be
"ruthlessly selfish", at least according to Dawkins. Rather
than answer your post directly, I will simply repost this
derivation and, if you find it relevant, perhaps I can
respond to specific questions you or anyone else might have
as to how it relates to the issues you have raised. Here's
a repeat of my earlier post:
***********************************************************
"Hill, David" wrote:
[snipped]
>
> ...Between "ought" claims and ordinary value judgments there
> is at least as much of a logical gap as any between is's and oughts.
>
[snipped]
>
> ....If someone could derive significant moral conclusions
> from factual descriptions, plus an appropriate functional analysis of a
> Darwinian sort, plus a few unchallenged axioms, that would be worth
doing,
> however you characterize the several sorts of premises involved.
>
[Phil Roberts' response to Hill]
In an earlier post I offered a formula for deriving a prudential 'ought'
from an epistemic 'is'. I think it might be helpful to attempt the
same thing again for a moral ought, and then go back and
take a look at what sort of premises underlie that ought.
1. Assume that 'being rational' is NOT simply a matter of
'being efficient' (means/end theory)
'being logical' (computationalism)
'being self-interested' (egoism)
'being happy' (pragmatism)
'being strategically logical (game theory)
'following a universalizable maxim (Kant)
'fulfilling one's desires' (hedonism)
'maximizing global happiness' (utilitarianism)
'truth or falsehood (Hume)
etc.
but simply a matter of
'being able to "see" what is going on' [non-formalizable
a la the Lucas/Penrose/Chaitin view of the implictions
of Godel's theorem]
with the metaphor unpacked to
'being rational' = 'being objective', not only cognitively,
BUT VALUATIVELY AS WELL.
2. Corroborate the epistemic credentials (the "is" component of the ought
derivation) of the above "theory" in terms of its ability to maximize
explanatory coherence better than any of its competitors (means/end,
egoism, etc.).
For example:
a. The theory can "explain", at least in a conceptual framework not
available from the perspective of competing theories, both the
excessive altruism and the emotional instability (volatility in
self-worth) observable in homo sapiens, in that they can both
be construed as two different sides of the same valuative
objectivity coin (an equalizing of value between the interests
of others and one's self). Since in the above theory, rationality
correlates with valuative objectivity, homo sapiens would be
construed as having become MORE RATIONAL than the predicted norm
(ruthless selfishness). While this doesn't offer us an immediate
causal account of the anomalies in question (altruism and
emotional
instability), it certainly offers one a new conceptual framework
for thinking about them which, in turn, might lead to an improved
causal account (e.g., they are maladaptive byproducts of the
evolution of rationality).
b. The theory can shed new light on a number of rationality paradoxes
such as Newcomb's Problem, Prisoner's Dilemma, etc., in that all
such paradoxes stem from the assumption that rationality is a
strategic attribute
c. The theory can cir***vent the logical paradoxes of rational
irrationality, similar to the example offered by Derek Parfit
on page 12 of 'Reasons and Persons'.
d. The theory can explain the chaos of the Cohen symposium on
rationality ('The Behavioral and Brain Sciences', 1981, 4,
317-370) by sharpening the distinction between logic and
reasoning (I wouldn't go into this here).
e. The theory can offer intersubjectively reproducible empirical
evidence (feelings of worthlessness) that mother nature's most
rational species is beginning to show signs of "standing outside
the system" (Lucas) corroborating the Lucas and Penrose position
on the implications of Godel's incompleteness theorem (i.e., minds
are not machines). (again a bit too complex an issue for
explanation in this particular post).
f. The theory is compatible with what is the currently
accepted paradigm for practical rationality, the 'equal
weight' criterion, albeit extended beyond the periphery
of self-interest:
My feelings a year hence should be just as im****tant to me as
my feelings next minute, if only I could make an equally sure
forecast of them. Indeed this equal and impartial concern for
all parts of one's conscious life is perhaps the most prominent
element in the common notion of the _rational_. (Henry
Sidgwick, 'The Methods of Ethics').
All these theories [of rational self-interest] also claim that,
in deciding what would be best for someone, we should give equal
weight to all the parts of this person's future. Later events
may be less predictable; and a predictable event should count
for
less if it is less likely to happen. But it should not count
for less merely because, if it happens, it will happen later
(Derek Parfit, 'Reasons and Persons').
3. Derive the 'ought' component via the syllogism:
PERMISE:
'Given that one chooses to be rational,
CONNECTIVE
then one 'ought' to
MORAL MAXIM:
'Love (value) their neighbor as they love (value)
themself'.
Notice that this moral maxim does not contain any values in the
maxim itself. It merely states, given that one values X
such and such an amount, then one ought to value Y such and such
an amount. But that does not mean that the ought doesn't have
underlying premises. Indeed, it would seem to have both a
cognitive AND a valuative premise. The cognitive premise is that
the underlying theory of rationality is "true", and the valuative
premise is that the individual in question values rationality.
And guess what? I don't think this is actually MY theory of
rationality, in that I suspect the maxim itself rings a bell in
just about anyone capable of reflective thought.
My conclusion then. Moral oughts are entailments of an implicit
theory of rationality we humans have been subconsciously entertaining
for the past several thousand years (as evidenced by the widespread
acceptance of the moral maxim) and as such is entailed by the
implicit cognitive premise that our shared theory of rationality is
"true" and the shared valuative premise that rationality is itself of
intrinsic worth, or at least of sufficient worth to warrant that
humans will often sacrifice their well-being, and at times their
very lives (e.g., self-incinerating Buddhist monks) in the pursuit
of moral objectives.
--
Phil Roberts, Jr.
Why We Turned Out Like Captain Kirk Instead of Mr. Spock:
The Psychodynamics of Genetic Indeterminism
http://www.fortunecity.com/victorian/dada/90/Kirk.htm
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