In "Epistemic Luck", Duncan Pritchard offers a wonderful example of
what philosophers can do for psychology during the period of so-called
normal science. . . . The scientist's conceptual warehouse has a
tendency to get a bit untidy and it is up to the philosopher to tidy
things up a bit, and this is just what Pritchard does with his work in
"Epistemic Luck". I know of no empirical work that has been attempted
on luck and that is no surprise. . . . Luck as Pritchard explains it,
cannot be written off as neither chance (unpredictable) nor accident
(unpredicted or of indeterminate cause). The former error is more
likely in cases of more purely epistemic claims and the latter is
often more compromising in cases of so called analogous claims
involving moral luck. Link:
http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=3963&cn=394&PHPSESSID=74a2d54cb63fcf11c1a8d0d807684322
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