Link: http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Mind/MindElli.htm
ABSTRACT: Most versions of the knowledge argument say that if a
scientist observing my brain does not know what my consciousness 'is
like,' then consciousness is not identical with physical brain
processes. This unwarrantedly equates 'physical' with 'empirically
observable.' However, we can conclude only that consciousness is not
identical with anything empirically observable. Still, given the
intimate connection between each conscious event (C) and a
corresponding empirically observable physiological event (P), what P-C
relation could render C empirically unobservable? Some suggest that C
is a relation among Ps which is distinguishable because it is multi-
realizable; that is, C could have been realized by P2 rather than P1
and still have been the same relation. C might even be a 'self-
organizing' process, appropriating and replacing its own material
substrata. How can this account explain the empirical unobservability
of consciousness? Because the emotions motivating attention direction,
partly constitutive of phenomenal states, are executed, not undergone,
by organisms. Organisms-self-organizing processes actively
appropriating their needed physical substrata-feel motivations by
generating them. Thus, experiencing someone's consciousness entails
executing his or her motivations. Link:
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Mind/MindElli.htm
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