You know that Serge Trifkovic was the paid publicist for Radovan=20
Karadjic for many years, don't you?
Steve Hayes wrote:
> Karadzic's Arrest: Bosnian Myths Rehashed
>
> by Srdja Trifkovic
>
> July 22, 2008
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------=
---
> ------
>
> The spirit of the media frenzy surrounding the arrest of the former
> Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic on July 21 is based entirely on th=
e
> doctrine of non-equivalence inaugurated in 1992: Serbs willed the war,=
> Muslims wanted peace; Serb crimes are bad and justly exaggerated, Musli=
m
> crimes are understandable. This doctrine was spectacularly reiterated a=
> month before Karadzic's capture, when the Muslim wartime commander of
> Srebrenica, Nasir Oric, was found not guilty by The Hague Tribunal of a=
ny
> responsibility for the killing of thousands of Serb civilians by the
> forces under his command in the three years before the fall of the encl=
ave
> in July 1995. It is also apparent today, in the endless media repetitio=
n
> of Karadzic's alleged bellicose intransigence before and during the
> Bosnian war.
>
> UNRESOLVED ISSUE OF WAR GUILT
>
> The imbalance is more than merely unfair. The talking heads gloating ov=
er
> Karadzic's capture no longer need to suppress the thought that differen=
t
> U.S. policies could have prevented the horror of "Bosnia," because no s=
uch
> thought-however pertinent in this case-ever occurs to them. Yet the fa=
ct
> remains that in the spring of 1992 the late Warren Zimmermann, the last=
> U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia before its breakup and civil war, materia=
lly
> contributed-probably more than any other single man-to the outbreak of =
the
> war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The facts of the case have been established
> beyond reasonable doubt and are no longer dosputed by experts.
>
> Nine months earlier, in June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared
> independence, a move that triggered off a short war in Slovenia and a
> sustained conflict in Croatia where the Serbs refused to accept Tudjman=
's
> fait accompli. These events had profound consequences on Bosnia and
> Herzegovina, that "Yugoslavia in miniature." The Serbs (34%) adamantly
> opposed the idea of Bosnian independence. The Croats (17%) predictably
> rejected any suggestion that Bosnia and Herzegovina remains within a
> Serb-dominated rump Yugoslavia.
>
> Alija Izetbegovic, the leader of the Muslim community (43%), had decide=
d
> as early as September 1990 that Bosnia should also declare independence=
if
> Slovenia and Croatia secede. On 27 February 1991 he went a step further=
:
> "I would sacrifice peace for a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina, but for th=
at
> peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina I would not sacrifice sovereignty." The
> process culminated with the referendum on independence (29 February 199=
2).
> The Serbs duly boycotted it. In the end just over 62 percent of voters
> opted for independence, overwhelmingly Muslims and Croats; but even thi=
s
> figure was short of the two-thirds majority required by the constitutio=
n.
> This did not stop the rump government of Izetbegovic from declaring
> independence on 3 March.
>
> Simultaneously one last attempt was under way to save peace. The
> ****tuguese foreign minister Jose Cutileiro organized a conference in
> Lisbon attended by the three communities' leaders, Izetbegovic, Radovan=
> Karadzic, and the Croat leader Mate Boban. The EU mediators persuaded t=
he
> three sides that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be independent but internall=
y
> organized on the basis of ethnic regions or "cantons."
>
> The breakthrough was due to the Bosnian Serbs' acceptance of an
> independent Bosnia, provided that the Muslims give up their ambition of=
a
> centralized, unitary one. Izetbegovic appeared to accept that this was =
the
> best deal he could make-but soon he was to change his mind. When he
> returned from Lisbon, Zimmermann flew post haste from Belgrade to Saraj=
evo
> to tell him that the U.S. did not stand behind the Cutileiro plan. He s=
aid
> it was a means to "a Serbian power grab" that could be prevented by
> internationalizing the problem. When Izetbegovic said that he did not l=
ike
> the Lisbon agreement, Zimmerrmann encouraged him to renege. State
> Department subsequently admitted that the US policy "was to encourage
> Izetbegovic to break with the partition plan." The New York Times (Augu=
st
> 29, 1993) brought a revealing quote from the key player himself:
>
> The embassy [in Belgrade] was for recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovi=
na
> from sometime in February on," Mr. Zimmermann said of his policy
> recommendation from Belgrade. "Meaning me." . Immediately after Mr.
> Izetbegovic returned from Lisbon, Mr. Zimmermann called on him in
> Sarajevo. "He said he didn't like it; I told him, if he didn't like i=
t,
> why sign it?"
>
> After that moment Izetbegovic had no motive to take the ongoing
> EC-brokered talks seriously., just as the Albanians had no motive to
> negotiate with Belgrade in 2007, after President Bush declared in Tiran=
a
> that it would become independent. After his encounter with Zimmermann
> Izetbegovic felt authorized to renege on tripartite accord, and he knew=
> that the U.S. administration would come to his assistance to enforce th=
e
> independence of a unitary Bosnian state.
>
> The motives of Zimmermann and his political bosses in Wa****ngton were n=
ot
> rooted in the concern for the Muslims of Bosnia as such, or indeed any
> higher moral principle. Their policy had no basis in the law of nations=
,
> or in the notions of truth or justice. It was the end-result of the
> interaction of pressure groups within the American power structure: Sau=
dis
> and other Muslims, neocons, Turks, One-World Nation Builders, Russophob=
es.
> all had their field day. Thus the war in the Balkans evolved from a
> Yugoslav disaster and a European inconvenience into a major test of "U.=
S.
> leader****p." This was made possible by a bogus consensus which passed f=
or
> Europe's Balkan policy. This consensus, amplified in the media, limited=
> the scope for meningful debate.
>
> Zimmermann's ploy heralded a virulently anti-Serb, agenda-driven form o=
f
> Realpolitik that was to dominate America's Bosnian policy. Just as Germ=
any
> sought to paint its Maastricht Diktat on Croatia's recognition in Decem=
ber
> 1991 as an expression of the "European consensus," after Zimmermann's
> intervention in Sarajevo Wa****ngton's fait accomplis were straightfaced=
ly
> labeled as "the will of the international community." Europe was resent=
ful
> but helpless when the United States resorted to covert action to smuggl=
e
> arms into Croatia and Bosnia in violation of U.N. resolutions.
> Zimmermann's torpedoing of the EU Lisbon formula in 1992 started a tren=
d
> that frustrated the Europeans, but they were helpless.
>
> Cutileiro was embittered by the US action and accused Izetbegovic of
> reneging on the agreement. Had the Muslims not done so, he recalled in
> 1995, "the Bosnian question might have been settled earlier, with less
> loss of life and land." Cutileiro also noted that the decision to reneg=
e
> on the signed agreement was not only Izetbegovic's, as he was encourage=
d
> to scupper that deal and to fight for a unitary Bosnian state by foreig=
n
> mediators."
>
> THE SETTING
>
> Over the past two centuries Balkan lands were bargaining chips for
> alliance construction. The Bosnian war of 1992-95 confirmed this trend.=
It
> was the most destructive segment of the War of Yugoslav Dissolution tha=
t
> began when the Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia seceded in th=
e
> summer of 1991. With no ethnic majority and no "Bosnian" nation, of all=
> six republics of the old Yugoslav federation the Republic of
> Bosnia-Herzegovina had most to fear from violent secession. Yet once
> reunited Germany was committed to the recognition of Croatia and Sloven=
ia,
> the Muslim leader****p in Sarajevo knew both that the old Yugoslavia was=
> dead and that historic op****tunities beckoned.
>
> At the outset of the present crisis most inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegov=
ina
> did not want to become "Bosnians" in any political sense; but they were=
> unaware of the extent to which their future depended on events beyond
> their republic's boundaries. The ruling League of Communists of Yugosla=
via
> literally disintegrated in the first months of 1990, setting the stage =
for
> multi-party elections in all six federal republics. The resulting power=
> vacuum was felt in Bosnia-Herzegovina more keenly than in other republi=
cs
> because the Party rule there was more rigidly doctrinaire than in other=
> federal units. When the first multi-party election since 1938 finally t=
ook
> place in November 1990, the voters overwhelmingly acted in accordance w=
ith
> their ethnic loyalties that proved more enduring than any ideological
> differences between them.
>
> The weakness or even non-existence of non-nationalist opposition to the=
> old communist establishment was at least partly due to the deliberate
> Western policy of appeasement of Tito's dictator****p following his brea=
k
> with Moscow in 1948. Contrary to the situation in Poland ("Solidarity")=
or
> Czechoslovakia ("Charter 77"), in Tito's lifetime and even in the decad=
e
> following his death in 1980 there had been no serious attempt by the
> United States to develop or cultivate alternative political teams in
> Yugoslavia among the narrow stratum of the intellectual establishment
> which could have been considered friendly to "Western democracy." In
> accordance with the Kennan Doctrine, Tito's dictator****p enjoyed Americ=
a's
> cheque blanche to do as it pleased domestically, for as long as it shun=
ned
> full rapprochement with Moscow.
>
> When the system unravelled the Muslims were the first to organize,
> founding their Stranka Demokratske Akcije, SDA (Party of Democratic
> Action) in March 1990. The Croats followed two months later with the
> creation of Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine-HDZ BiH
> (Croatian Democratic Union); in reality theirs was but a local subsidia=
ry
> of the retired YPA General Franjo Tudjman's HDZ in Zagreb. Finally, in
> July the Serbs established the Srpska Demokratska Stranka Bosne i
> Hercegovine, SDS (Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina). The
> pattern of the Muslims and Croats acting proactively, and the Serbs
> reacting, was thus established very early on.
>
> When the Bosnian election results were tallied, they effectively read l=
ike
> a census plain and simple. The overwhelming share of the vote-80
> percent-went to the three parties that had grounded their appeal in the=
> ethnic-national identity and issues. In the National Assembly of 240 se=
ats
> (Chamber of Citizens and Chamber of Municipalities), the SDA won 86 sea=
ts,
> the SDS took 72 seats, and the HDZ 44. The three winning parties soon
> reached a power-sharing agreement. Although the maverick
> businessman-politician Fikret Abdic from the region of Velika Kladusa
> polled more votes, due to the constitutional vagaries of the late-Yugos=
lav
> Bosnia Alija Izetbegovic was elected President of a seven-member
> multi-ethnic rotating presidency. The prime ministry of the Republic we=
nt
> to the HDZ, and the presidency of the Assembly to the SDS.
>
> The tripartite coalition agreement was applicable not only to the
> distribution of posts at the level of the Republic, but also at the
> regional and municipal level. The ruling SDA-SDS-HDZ coalition, contrar=
y
> to some dark predictions by the defeated communists, started functionin=
g
> without major difficulties in the early months of the new regime. The
> notion of such cooperation was counter-intuitive to the outside observe=
rs
> of the Bosnian scene, but it made perfect sense in the context of the
> common desire by all three groups to purge the body-politic of the
> decades-long layers of communist lies and distortions.
>
> In Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1990 three tiers of government authority were =
in
> existence, those of the Republic itself, of the regions, and of
> municipalities. Depending on the level of participation among the
> coalition partners, the distribution of political power was accordingly=
> carried out at all levels. The apparent ability of the three "nationali=
st"
> parties to cooperate in the immediate aftermath of the election was bas=
ed
> on one thing they all had in common: the desire to break free from the
> Titoist straightjacket. During Tito's lifetime the three constituent
> nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina found themselves under steady pressure to=
> "Bosnify" their identities. (Bosnian Serb writing, to take a little kno=
wn
> but drastic example, was not to be classed as Serbian literature but as=
> Bosnian literature.)
>
> The SDA, the HDZ, and the SDS, all sought to recreate long-established
> identities, to represent real, traditional national diversity as agains=
t a
> new, synthetic ("modern") composite identity. This was a blast of fresh=
> air; it was not the precursor of war as one can see from the simple fac=
t
> of amicable co-operation. It was, in any case, a natural response to th=
e
> decay of communist authority. But the SDS were in no sense "anti-Yugosl=
av"
> in the political sense: what they were against was the communist
> cultivation of false nationality ("Yugoslav," "Bosnian"), as against th=
e
> spontaneous, natural identities of the historic nationalities of
> Yugoslavia.
>
> Had Yugoslavia not been breaking up in 1991-92, this emphasis on
> traditional identities would have passed as a perfectly natural democra=
tic
> readjustment to reality. The "Left Bloc" was finished, defeated even in=
> the municipality of Prijedor where it confidently expected to be
> victorious thanks to the area's "Partisan" tradition and strong "Yugosl=
av"
> spirit. The old CPY apparat was simply irrelevant: the pampered friends=
> and clients of the old bureaucracy, who could not explain why their
> version of Yugoslavia had needed a police state to keep together. The
> truth is that there was no internal, Bosnian threat to peace at the
> beginning of 1991: when it came the threat was from outside. The SDS an=
d
> the SDA were not simply in coalition: they were natural allies while
> Bosnia remained at peace, although they would become just as natural
> enemies if Yugoslavia fell apart.
>
> KARADZIC'S EARLY POSITION
>
> Karadzic headed the party representing the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina,=
> and they wanted, overwhelmingly, to preserve the status quo. Since they=
> had no desire for the destruction of Yugoslavia, they were forced into
> reactive posture vis-=E0-vis those who willed the Federation's
> disintegration. It is im****tant to dispose of the idea that the Serbs o=
f
> Bosnia in 1991 were simply fanaticized by Belgrade propaganda: they wer=
e
> still gasping for air after the Titoist era and composing a revisionist=
> history of ethnic civil war and Serbian suffering, a history which may
> have contained new exaggerations, but which corrected the evasions and
> lies in the old story.
>
> At the outset of the last Yugoslav crisis, the Serbs' basic argument-ev=
en
> if seldom stated with simplicity and coherence-was clear when freed fro=
m
> rhetoric: they had lived in one state since 1918, when Yugoslavia came
> into being. They reluctantly accepted Tito's arbitrarily determined
> internal boundaries between the six federal republics-which left one th=
ird
> of them outside Serbia-proper-on the grounds that the Yugoslav framewor=
k
> afforded them a measure of security from the repetition of the nightmar=
e
> of 1941-1945; but they could not swallow an illegal ruse that aimed to
> turn them into minorities, overnight and by unconstitutional means, in
> their own land.
>
> Even without the vividly remembered trauma of the Second World War, the=
y
> reacted in 1991-1992 just as the Anglophone citizens of Texas or Arizon=
a
> might do if they are outvoted, one day, in a referendum demanding those=
> states' incor****ation into Mexico. They demanded the right that the
> territories, which the Serbs have inhabited as compact majorities long
> before the voyage of the Mayflower, not be subjected to the rule of the=
ir
> rivals. In the same vein the Protestant Ulstermen demanded - and were
> given - the right to stay apart from united Ireland when the nationalis=
ts
> in Dublin opted for secession in 1921. In the same vein the state of We=
st
> Virginia was created in 1863, incor****ating those counties of the
> Commonwealth of Virginia that refused to be forced into secession. The
> Loyalists of Ulster and the Unionists of West Virginia were just as gui=
lty
> of a "Joint Criminal Enterprise" to break up Ireland, or the Old Domini=
on,
> as were the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina who did not want to be dragged
> into secession against their will.
>
> Yugoslavia was admittedly a deeply flawed polity, and there could have
> been no rational objection to the striving of Croats, and even Bosnian
> Muslims, to create their own nation-states. But equally there could hav=
e
> been no justification for forcing over two million Serbs west of the Dr=
ina
> to be incor****ated into those states against their will, and without an=
y
> guarantees of their rights. Yugoslavia came together in 1918 as a union=
of
> South Slav peoples, and not of states, or territorial units. Its divorc=
e
> should have been effected on the same basis; the boundaries of the
> republics should have been altered accordingly.
>
> This is, and has been, the real foundation of the Yugoslav conflict eve=
r
> since the first shots were fired in the summer of 1991. Even someone as=
> unsympathetic to the Serb point of view as Lord David Owen conceded tha=
t
> Josip Broz Tito's internal administrative boundaries between Yugoslavia=
's
> republics were grossly arbitrary, and that their redrawing should have
> been countenanced at the time of Yugoslavia's disintegration:
>
> Incomprehensibly, the proposal to redraw the republics' boundaries ha=
d
> been rejected by all eleven EC countries. [T]o rule out any discussio=
n
> or op****tunity for compromise in order to head off war was an
> extraordinary decision. My view has always been that to have stuck
> unyieldingly to the internal boundaries of the six republics within t=
he
> former Yugoslavia. as being the boundaries for independent states, wa=
s a
> folly far greater than that of premature recognition itself.
>
> THE MUSLIM STRATEGY
>
> Of the three ethnic-religious parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslim=
> party-the SDA-was perhaps the most radical, in that it alone advocated =
a
> fundamental restructuring of the Bosnian society in accordance with div=
ine
> revelation. It attempted to do so not on Bosnia's own terms, not within=
> the Republic's own local paradigm, but within the terms of the
> global-historical process-as its leaders saw it-of the global Islamic
> renaissance. Many commentators in the West have been in a state of deni=
al
> for years about the true nature of Alija Izetbegovic's long-term progra=
m.
> To put it simply, they preferred to believe their own assurances that
> Izetbegovic's blueprint is not "Islamist" but "multicultural."
>
> Not unlike Islamist parties elsewhere-notably the ruling Justice and
> Development Party (AKP) in Turkey-the SDA had a public, "secular" front=
,
> and an inner core of Islamic cadres that remained semi-conspiratorial i=
n
> the early days. This is vividly described by one of the party's founder=
s
> who had previously made a successful business career in the West, Adil
> Zulfikarpasic. He was appalled by the "fascist" methods of the SDA and =
by
> its "conservative, religious, populist" orientation, Adil Zulfikarpasic=
> founded his own party, the MBO (Muslim Bosniak Organization). It fared
> badly in the elections of 1990 but it nevertheless left an im****tant ma=
rk
> by charting the potential for a genuinely secular, "post-Islamic"
> political force of the Bosniaks.
>
> In the early stages of the Bosnian crisis numerous Western re****ters an=
d
> commentators have claimed that the SDS sought to scare Bosnian Serbs wi=
th
> exaggerated and untrue claims of the militantly Islamic character of th=
e
> SDA ideology and policy. It is a matter of record, however, that
> Izetbegovic was an advocate of Sharia law and a theorist of the Islamic=
> Republic long before the first shots were fired. Already as a young man=
> during World War II, Izetbegovic was a member of the Young Muslims
> organization (Mladi Muslimani). His was a radical Islamic political
> organization inspired by the teaching of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, =
Al
> Husseini, who toured the German-occupied Europe preaching that the Thir=
d
> Reich and the Muslim world had a natural community of interests that
> demanded personal commitment of every able-bodied Muslim. Izetbegovic's=
> ideas subsequently matured into a comprehensive, programmatic statement=
in
> the Islamic Declaration (1970), the do***ent that led to his imprisonme=
nt
> by the communist authorities in 1983.
>
> The Declaration became Izetbegovic's de facto political platform.
> Reprinted in Sarajevo at a key moment in 1990, it startled the public. =
In
> the language familiar to the students of militant jihad everywhere, it
> called for Islamic moral and religious regeneration, and for the
> strengthening of different types of Islamic unity-up to, and including,=
> armed struggle for the creation of an Islamic polity in countries where=
> Muslims represent the majority of the population.
>
> As Izetbegovic put it,
>
> The Islamic movement must, and can, take over power as soon as it is
> morally and numerically so strong that it can not only destroy the
> existing non-Islamic power, but also build up a new Islamic one. Ther=
e
> is no peace or coexistence between the Islamic faith and non-Islamic
> social and political institutions.
>
> This was a political program par excellence that non-Islamic groups in
> Bosnia could not accept; for the Serbs "it confirmed their suspicions t=
hat
> Izetbegovic wished to transform Bosnia-Herzegovina into an Islamic stat=
e."
> The author's contempt for Western values is evident in his dismissal of=
> the Kemalist tradition: "Turkey as an Islamic country used to rule the
> world. Turkey as an imitation of Europe represents a third-rate country=
> the like of which there is a hundred in the world." Elsewhere, he accep=
ts
> the "achievements of Euro-American civilization" but only in the area o=
f
> "science and technology. we shall have to accept them if we wish to
> survive." In a revealing sentence, Izetbegovic discusses the status of
> non-Muslims in countries with Muslim majorities: "The non-Muslim
> minorities within an Islamic state, on condition that they are loyal
> [emphasis added], enjoy religious freedom and all protection." He
> advocates "the creation of a united Islamic community from Morocco to
> Indonesia."
>
> It should be stressed that Izetbegovic's views are unremarkable from a
> traditional Islamic point of view. The final objective is Dar al Islam,=
> where Muslims dominate and infidelssubmit. That is the meaning of
> Izetbegovic's apparent generosity to the non-Muslims, "provided that th=
ey
> are loyal": the non-Muslims can be "protected persons" only if they
> submitted to Islamic domination.
>
> In his daily political discourse Izetbegovic behaved throughout the 199=
0s
> as a de facto nationalist, fostering narrowly-defined Bosniak (i.e.,
> Muslim) nationalist feeling and seeking to equate the emerging "Bosniak=
"
> identity with an imaginary supra-ethnic "Bosnia." He was juxtaposing th=
e
> construct with the two traditionally Christian communities-Serbs and
> Croats-whose loyalties were alleged to lie elsewhere, with Belgrade and=
> Zagreb respectively. The two sides of Izetbegovic's personality-the dee=
ply
> committed Islamist on one hand and the functional nationalist on
> another-were not at odds, since within his terms of reference the Bosni=
ak
> ethnicity was defined by religion, the Muslim religion.
>
> Izetbegovic should not be blamed for being what he is, nor should his
> followers be condemned for subscribing to his outlook: Luther would say=
> that he and they kann nicht anders. But to have Alija Izetbegovic, with=
> his record and his vision, as the head of a democratic, pluralist state=
> anywhere in the world, is simply unthinkable. But for his peculiar visi=
on
> to be applied in practice, Bosnia-Herzegovina had to be taken out of
> Yugoslavia and proclaimed independent and sovereign.
>
> THE ROAD TO WAR
>
> As the fateful year of 1991 approached, the Serbs would have preferred =
an
> all-Yugoslav referendum based on the principle of "one man-one vote," w=
ith
> a simple question-"Yugoslavia, Yes or No?"-and with the result binding =
for
> all. While in theory this same principle should have appealed to the
> Western democracies, in practice the "international community" appeared=
to
> be too deeply committed to the quasi-federal Titoist framework to quest=
ion
> the assumptions of the secessionist-minded leaders in Croatia and
> Slovenia-assumptions that paved the way for disintegration. The
> separatists preferred the model of localized, republic-by-republic
> elections. Once they were in power, those elections would be followed b=
y
> ambiguously worded referenda on independence with de facto preordained
> outcomes. This strategy had little to do with "democracy," but it prove=
d
> effective in radicalizing political discourse and escalating Yugoslavia=
's
> crisis.
>
> In early 1990 separatist parties had already triumphed in Slovenia and
> Croatia. In December of that year Slobodan Milosevic's authoritarian
> Socialist Party of Serbia gained a convincing victory in Serbia's
> elections. The media in all republics had been busy pursuing openly
> nationalist themes, and the politicians followed suit. In December 1990=
> the Slovenes voted for an "independent and sovereign state," and within=
> months Slovenia stopped sending conscripts to serve in the federal arme=
d
> forces. That same month the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia adopted=
> the new Constitution-the so-called Christmas Constitution-that defined =
the
> Republic of Croatia as the "nation-state of the Croatian people." The
> constituent status of the Serbian people in Croatia was thus abrogated =
and
> the Serbs in Croatia were reduced to the status of a national minority.=
>
> Unlike Slovenia, however, Croatia had within its boundaries a large Ser=
b
> population that resented being stripped of its status as a constituent
> nation. The Serbs had initially favoured the preservation of Yugoslavia=
,
> but in the light of Slovene and Croat moves towards independence they
> raised the issue of self-determination. This was specifically related t=
o
> the question of adjusting borders between the Yugoslav federal units in=
> such a way as to allow various Serb communities outside Serbia to remai=
n
> attached to it.
>
> Separatist republics are free to go, the Serb argument essentially went=
,
> but they should not be allowed to take areas with a Serb plurality alon=
g
> with them. Slovenia's and Croatia's declarations of independence (June =
25,
> 1991) were accordingly followed by rather different responses. There wa=
s a
> short conflict in Slovenia involving the Yugoslav Army, and a sustained=
> and much bloodier war in Croatia involving local Serbs. Inevitably thes=
e
> events were bound to have profound consequences on Bosnia.
>
> Izetbegovic's chief concern was to find a pretext for the intended
> separation from Yugoslavia-any Yugoslavia-and to use the Croat tactical=
> alliance in pursuit of that goal; the day of reckoning with the HDZ cou=
ld
> come later. The decision by Izetbegovic to treat Tudjman's bid for
> independence as the cue for Bosnia's repeat act was fateful: the moment=
> that the SDA made it clear that it would not remain in any Yugoslavia
> without Croatia, war was inevitable in Bosnia. Izetbegovic was willing =
to
> risk that war. In the 1990 election campaign he said that the Muslims
> would "defend Bosnia with arms." In February 1991 he declared in the
> Assembly: "I would sacrifice peace for a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina, =
but
> for that peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina I would not sacrifice sovereignty.=
"
> To the Serbs this was a war cry. By May Izetbegovic went even further,
> saying that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina probably could not be avoided=
> because "for a state to be created, for a nation to be forged, it has t=
o
> endure this, it is some kind of fate, destiny." This statement echoed h=
is
> Islamic fatalism.
>
> KARADZIC AND MILOSEVIC
>
> Over the past two centuries Balkan lands were bargaining chips for
> alliance construction. The Bosnian war of 1992-95 confirmed this trend.=
It
> was the most destructive segment of the War of Yugoslav Dissolution. Wi=
th
> no ethnic majority and no "Bosnian" nation, of all six republics of the=
> old Yugoslav federation the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina had most to
> fear from violent secession. Yet once reunited Germany was committed to=
> the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, the Muslim leader****p in Saraj=
evo
> knew both that the old Yugoslavia was dead and that historic op****tunit=
ies
> beckoned.
>
> President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, however, played the Bosnian cri=
sis
> primarily as a means of consolidating his power in Serbia proper and
> extending his influence without committing himself to any clearly defin=
ed
> strategic objective, such as a "Greater Serbia." By contrast, President=
> Franjo Tudjman of Croatia did not shed Marxist crocodile tears at the
> passing of the old Titoist certainties. Unlike Milosevic he was a true
> nationalist. In April 1992 he brought Croatian troops into western
> Herzegovina just as Milosevic withdrew the Yugoslav National Army (JNA)=
> from Bosnia. Furthermore, in a twisted re-enactment of the
> chetnik-partisan divide, Milosevic had constantly sought to deepen the
> divide between the civilian leader****p in Pale headed by Karadzic, and =
the
> military HQ at Han Pijesak led by General Ratko Mladic.
>
> When the Bosnian Serbs took control of the Serb-majority areas and
> connecting corridors in 1992, they were well equipped and officered. Bu=
t
> the numerical advantage lay with the Muslims, who hoped to win in the e=
nd
> with international help. Radavan Karadzic never understood that this wa=
s,
> indeed, Izetbegovic's grand strategy, and that time was not on the side=
of
> the Serbs.
>
> In addition Karadzic personally and the Serbs collectively were severel=
y
> damaged by the western media handling of their mistreatment of Muslim
> prisoners and by their expulsion of non-Serb civilians in the summer of=
> 1992. Similar atrocities by Croats and Muslims against Serbs and agains=
t
> each other, while no less common, were less conspicuous and deemed
> unworthy of attention. The Western elite class chose its sympathies at =
the
> start and kept up an agitation in favor of military intervention agains=
t
> the Serbs.
>
> Of several peace plans offered or mediated by the Europeans, Karadzic w=
as
> under particular pressure-especially from Milosevic in Belgrade-to acce=
pt
> the Vance-Owen Plan (May 1993) that would have divided Bosnia into ten
> "cantons." He initialled its acceptance, but subsequently it was reject=
ed
> by the Republika Srpska national assembly. Only months later Muslims
> rejected the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan that provided for a confederal model=
of
> three sovereign national entities (December 1993). A vague yet
> "non-negotiable" plan presented by the "Contact Group" in 1994 was refu=
sed
> by the Serbs. It was quietly discarded in early 1995, by which time the=
> Clinton Administration decided to intervene directly on the Muslim side=
=2E
>
> KARADZIC'S COSTLY MISCALCULATIONS
>
> The media call for intervention, launched in its early stage, made the
> Bosnian war the subject of international debate to an extent unknown si=
nce
> Vietnam. Many Europeans were inclined to sup****t a compromise peace, a
> federalized Bosnia, and a real arms embargo; whereas the United States
> disliked European peace plans, broke the arms embargo starting in late
> 1993, and overtly sup****ted the Muslims.
>
> In 1992-1993 Karadzic made a fundamental miscalculation that made the w=
ar
> unwinnable for the Serbs. Ever obsessed with maps, square miles and
> territorial percentages to the detriment of strategic planning, he sat =
on
> his advantages and hoped that in the fulness of time the world would
> recognize the Serbs' apparent victory. His often repeated adage, "we do=
n't
> want to defeat them [Muslims], we want to separate from them," was absu=
rd,
> however: the latter could not be effected without securing the former.
>
> Blinkered by his flawed assumptions, Karadzic failed to grasp the tecto=
nic
> ****ft that took place in January 1994, when the U.S. sponsored a
> Croat-Muslim alliance and the Europeans realized that there would be no=
> settlement unless they surrendered political leader****p to Wa****ngton.
> This new stage was inaugurated in February 1994, when a mortar shell fe=
ll
> on the crowded Markale market in Sarajevo. The Serbs were duly blamed, =
and
> evidence that the shell could not have been fired from Serbian lines
> became available too late to affect the subsequent crisis.
>
> From this point the war became a matter of Muslim attempts to exploit t=
he
> "safe areas"-in Sarajevo, Gorazde, Tuzla, Bihac, and Srebrenica-which h=
ad
> been declared by the UN but never demilitarized. In short the Muslims w=
ere
> allowed to attack out of these areas, but the Serbs were not allowed to=
> pursue them back in. From spring 1994 on the Muslims could no loger los=
e
> the war, which, in view of their weak starting position, was tantamount=
to
> winning it.
>
> Once treated as a key interlocutor in London, New York, or Geneva, by
> early 1995 Karadzic was no longer a player in the big game. In Wa****ngt=
on
> Bosnia was seen as an op****tunity to transform NATO from a purely
> defensive alliance into an "out-of-area" enforcement agency, thus pavin=
g
> the way for the Kosovo intervention four years later. The success of t=
he
> pro-intervention lobby in the media must be seen in the context of stro=
ng
> sup****t for their agitation from parts of the U.S. administration.
>
> Russia was the source of Karadzic's constant hopes and repeated
> disappointments. Often puzzled by Moscow's supine posture, he kept hopi=
ng
> that it would "shake itself up." Yet Yeltsin's Russia was weak, eager t=
o
> appease the West, and reluctant to exert itself in the Balkan area.
> Russian policy began with an almost ideological commitment to accepting=
> Western good faith, and Russia was slow to grasp that Wa****ngton wanted=
a
> peace settlement based on the defeat of the Serbs. By 1995 informed
> Russian opinion was getting alarmed at the direction events were taking=
,
> but it was too late, and too difficult, for the Yeltsin presidency to
> devise a new policy.
>
> In the summer of 1995 London and Paris reluctantly agreed to allow NATO=
to
> bomb the Serbs, while the United States reluctantly accepted the sort o=
f
> settlement the Europeans had wanted in 1992-3. But the bombing of the
> Bosnian Serb army in August 1995, which appeared to end the war, was le=
ss
> im****tant militarily than the entry of the Croatian Army into Bosnia, n=
ow
> trained and extensively re-equipped by the U.S. Even this Croatian
> intervention was only possible because the Yugoslav army refused to
> intervene to save its clients west of the Drina. The war ended because
> Milosevic of Serbia wanted it to end.
>
> The chief outcome of the war was a transformed NATO, and the renewal of=
> American leader****p in Europe to an extent not seen since Kennedy. It
> established that America wanted to lead, and to be indispensable, in th=
e
> process of European reorganization after 1989. Bosnia itself was not mu=
ch
> affected by international intervention. The war took longer than it wou=
ld
> have done and the Serbian position is more uncertain, but the settlemen=
t
> that followed Dayton is not unlike a plausible compromise that seemed
> within reach in Lisbon in April 1992.
>
> Richard Holbrooke, the chief U.S. negotiator in 1995, boasted a year
> later: "We are re-engaged in the world, and Bosnia was the test." This
> "we" meant the United States, not "the West" or "the international
> community." Indeed, no nation-state started and finished the Bosnian st=
ory
> as a political actor with an unchanged diplomatic personality. Each gre=
at
> power became a forum for the global debate for and against intervention=
,
> the debate for and against a certain kind NATO, and an associated,
> media-led international political process. The interventionists prevail=
ed
> then, and their narrative dominates the public commentary on Karadzic's=
> arrest now.
>
> VAE VICTIS.
>
> Far from bringing the Bosnian episode to a close, Karadzic's transfer t=
o
> The Hague raises an old question that remains unanswered by the
> interventionists: If the old Yugoslavia was untenable and eventually
> collapsed under the weight of the supposedly insurmountable differences=
> among its constituent nations, how can Bosnia-the Yugoslav microcosm pa=
r
> excellence-develop and sustain the dynamics of a viable polity? The ans=
wer
> will become known only when the outside powers lose their present inter=
est
> in upholding the constitutional edifice made in Dayton.
>
> As for the specific charges against Karadzic, we need not hypothesize a=
> pre-war "joint criminal enterprise" to ethnically cleanse and murder, t=
o
> explain the events of 1992-5. The crimes and violations of human rights=
> that followed were not the direct result of anyone's nationalist projec=
t.
> These crime, as Susan Woodward notes, "were the results of the wars and=
> their particular characteristics, not the causes."
>
> The effect of the legal intervention of the "international community" w=
ith
> its act of recognition was that a Yugoslav loyalty was made to look lik=
e a
> conspiratorial disloyalty to "Bosnia"-largely in the eyes of people who=
> supposed ex hypothesi that if there is a "Bosnia" there must be a natio=
n
> of "Bosnians." In 1943-4 Tito was able to force the Anglo-Americans to
> pretend that his struggle was not communist revolution. In 1992-5
> Izetbegovic forced the West to pretend that his jihad was the defense o=
f
> "multi-ethnicity." Both pretenses were absurd.
>
> How do they do it, these Balkan political impresarios? The Hague Tribun=
al
> does not recognize the question as legitimate and therefore does not se=
ek
> answers. The strange truth is that then, like now, great powers pay a f=
ee
> for entering the Balkan casino. They consent to someone's story, not "t=
he
> Truth."
>
> Radovan Karadzic will be duly convicted of genocide and crimes against
> humanity, and he will not come out of jail alive. The verdict is alread=
y
> written, but it reflects a fundamental imbalance. It ignores the essenc=
e
> of the Bosnian war-the Serbs' striving not to be forced into
> secession-while remaining mute about the culpability of the other two
> sides for a series of unconstitutional, illegitimate and illegal politi=
cal
> decisions that caused the war.=20
>
> The judgment against Karadzic at the U.S.-sponsored and largely
> U.S.-funded tribunal at The Hague will be built on this flawed foundati=
on.
> It will be neither fair or just, and therefore it will be detrimental t=
o
> what America should stand for in the world. It will also give further
> credence to the myth of Muslim blameless victimhood, Serb viciousness, =
and
> Western indifference, and therefore weaken our resolve in the global
> struggle euphemistically known as "war on terrorism." The former is a
> crime; the latter, a mistake.
>
>
>
> =20
|
